This first theorem has an important implication. Because z n must be non-negative, it must hold that p 0 T /s 0 > γv n /u n − 1. This means that the two-part tariff is more likely to be feasible when the v n is small or negative, or when the utilization rate u n is large. There is an obvious corollary. When the ratio v n is negative, a feasible two-part tariff always exists because the expression γv n /u n − 1 is negative. The second corollary follows from the fact that p 0 and s 0 are positive, and thus p 0 T /s 0 > 0. Therefore, a feasible two-part tariff also exists always when v n is positive but sufficiently small: v n < u n /γ.
The next two theorems explore the constraints on offering single-part tariffs.
Theorem 2 (FIT without CAT). If the utility does not offer a CAT, then it must offer a differentiated FIT p n such that f n /u n T ≤ p n ≤ z n /u n T .
Theorem 3 (CAT without FIT).
If the utility does not offer a FIT, then it must offer a differentiated CAT such that f n ≤ s n ≤ z n .
If the utility offers a two-part tariff, there is an equivalency relationship between the two components, defined in the next theorem.
Theorem 4 (Equivalence).
If the utility offers both FIT and CAT, any incentive pair (p n , s n ) and
The next two theorems explore the possibility that the utility offers a two-part tariff that is uniform across IPPs in one element and differentiated in the other element.
Theorem 5 (Uniform FIT). If the utility pays a uniform FIT ∀n : p n =p, it must offer a differentiated CAT s n so that f n −pu n T ≤ s n ≤ z n −pu n T .
Theorem 6 (Uniform CAT). If the utility pays a uniform CAT ∀n : s n =s, it must offer a differentiated FIT p n such that f n −s ≤ p n u n T ≤ z n −s.
A useful comparison concerns the conventional scenario of a uniform FIT without a second pricing instrument Theorem 7 (Conventional FIT). A uniform FIT ∀n : p n =p without CAT ∀n : s n = 0 is welfarereducing because it rejects projects n for whichp < f n /(u n T ) <p + s n /(u n T ) when s n would have been positive, and it accepts projects n for which p + s n /(u n T ) < z n /(u n T ) <p when s n would have been negative.
In other words, a uniform FIT without CAT falsely rejects projects whenp is not crediting new projects for their reduction in back-up capacity, and it falsely accepts projects whenp is not charging new projects for an increase in back-up capacity. Essentially, a uniform FIT without CAT generates type-I and type-II errors.
The final theorem looks at a variation of theorem 5 where the utility offers a uniform FIT, but with a differentiated CAT. This option has some desirable characteristics because it attributes the heterogeneity across firms to one pricing element only. It fixes the problem encountered in theorem 7.
Theorem 8 (Optimal uniform FIT with differentiated CAT). Among the feasible two-part tariffs is one that offers a uniform FIT defined by ∀n : p n =p = p 0 and a heterogeneous CAT defined by s n ≤ s 0 (u n − γv n ). The CAT is positive when u n > γv n and is negative when u n < γv n . When v n is negative, the CAT is guaranteed to be positive. Using (7) and (11), the sufficiency condition for the CAT to be positive is
When ∆ (n) < 0, the expression on the righthand side of (18) is negative, and thus the inequality always holds. But even for small positive ∆ (n) , the inequality will hold.
